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Abstract
Previous literature proved the existence of an upper bound on the probability of
trade in a bilateral trading problem when the valuations are distributed uniformly on
[0, 1]. This upper bound is achieved in the 12 -double auction when the players play the
Chatterjee-Samuelson strategies. We introduce behavioral-type players in a 12 -double
auction preceded by cheap talk. The behavioral-type players always declare a keenness
to trade in the cheap-talk stage and play the Chatterjee-Samuelson strategies if they
hear the “Keen” message. In equilibrium, the probability of trade between the strategic
types increases monotonically as the probability of the behavioral types increases. If
the probability of the behavioral types is high enough, the probability of trade between
the strategic types is greater than the upper bound.
Keywords: Bargaining; Double Auction; Cheap Talk; Incomplete Information; Be-
havioral Type; Probability of Trade
JEL: C78; D82
1 Introduction
In their seminal study of the double auctions, Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) find a pair
of linear strategies that is an equilibrium of the 1
2
-double auction when the valuations of
the players are distributed independently and uniformly (We term it the C-S equilibrium).
∗Email address: r.saran@algec.unimaas.nl; Tel: +31-43-3883763; Fax: +31-43-3884878
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When the valuations of the players are independently and uniformly distributed on [0, 1],
then Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) show that the associated C-S equilibrium of the
1
2
-double auction, which we term the C-S* equilibrium, achieves both the highest ex-ante
gains from trade and the highest ex-ante probability of trade relative to any equilibrium of
any trading mechanism.1 However, the gains from trade and the probability of trade that
are achieved in this equilibrium are much below the level that is first-best, that is, there
is not as much trade in equilibrium as desirable. The reason for such an outcome is that
the players do not have complete information about each others’ valuations. The buyer, for
example, has to balance two opposing motivations when she makes a bid, the lower she bids
the higher is her payoff if trade does occur but that also lowers the probability that she ends
up trading with the seller. The bid that is then optimal for the buyer may be such that even
though ex-post the seller’s valuation is below her valuation, trade may not occur.2
In such situations, players can often communicate before bargaining in order to “reduce”
the uncertainty. Farrell and Gibbons (1989) show that adding a cheap-talk stage before
playing the 1
2
-double auction can lead to effective communication, where different valuation
types of the players choose different messages in equilibrium (We term it the F-G equilib-
rium). However, the F-G equilibrium has a strictly lower ex-ante probability of trade than
the C-S* equilibrium. The reason is that the low valuation types of the buyer and the high
valuation types of the seller are willing to take the risk of not trading by communicating their
disinclination to trade in the cheap-talk stage for a better price in the bargaining stage.3
Experimental studies on the 1
2
-double auction by Radner and Schotter (1989), Valley et
al. (2002) and McGinn et al. (2003) confirm that trade occurs according to the predictions
of the C-S equilibrium when the players are not allowed to communicate before bargaining.4
1In fact, the C-S equilibrium of the 12 -double auction is a second-best as long as the valuations of both
players are distributed uniformly and independently on the same interval. However, for instance, if the
valuations of the buyer and seller are distributed uniformly and independently on [1, 3] and [0, 2], respectively,
then the C-S equilibrium is not a second-best. In general, Satterthwaite and Williams (1989) show that the
k-double auctions are not optimal for generic distributions of valuations.
2See chapter 5 in Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), Binmore et al. (1992), Kennan and Wilson (1993),
Ausubel et al. (2002) and Serrano (2005) for surveys on bargaining with incomplete information.
3More generally, the above mentioned result of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) implies that, when
the valuations of the players are distributed independently and uniformly on [0, 1], we cannot achieve a
higher probability of trade than that in the C-S* equilibrium by allowing for any form of communication
(simultaneous or sequential message exchanges) before the 12 -double auction.
4Radner and Schotter (1989) find that ‘the behavior of the subjects is qualitatively consistent with....linear
bidding strategies’ (p. 180), although the players in the role of the seller on average played according to the
C-S linear strategy, the players in the role of the buyer did not bid as low as in the C-S linear strategy. Valley
et al. (2002) report that the bidding behavior of the players in their experiments without communication
was “economically” close to the C-S equilibrium strategies.
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However, these studies also show that when the players are allowed to communicate “freely”
before bargaining, they are able to achieve a much higher probability of trade by using the
communication stage to either mutually reveal their valuations, coordinate on a single price
or coordinate on mutually bidding equal to their valuations.
Is it possible to bridge the gap between these theoretical and experimental results on
the 1
2
-double auction? It is not clear how to duplicate the arbitrary message space allowed
in the experiments in a theoretical model and even if it were possible, it would be very
complicated to solve for an equilibrium of such a model. However, replicating the increase
in the overall probability of trade observed in the experiments in a theoretical model is easy.
The experiments suggest that some players act non-strategically by mutually revealing their
valuations in the communication stage or coordinating to bid equal to their valuations in
the bargaining stage. Adding such non-strategic or behavioral-type of players to the model
will provide an exogenous boost to the overall probability of trade. If the proportion of
such players is high enough, then the overall probability of trade would be higher than that
in the C-S* equilibrium outcome. A more interesting theoretical question is that can the
probability of trade among only the strategic-type players be higher than that in the C-S*
equilibrium outcome?
Taking a cue from the experiments, suppose a proportion of the players are behavioral
type in the sense that they are use the pre-bargaining communication stage to coordinate on
bidding “less aggressively” in the bargaining stage. One way to achieve such coordination in
the bargaining stage is that the behavioral-type players bid “less aggressively” only if both
the players send the same message in the communication stage – e.g. both players must smile
or express a keenness to trade as in our model. In the absence of such behavioral types, the
low valuation types of the strategic-type buyer and the high valuation types of the strategic-
type seller would prefer to communicate their disinclination to trade in the cheap-talk stage
in the hope of a better price in the bargaining stage, which can reduce the probability of trade
among the strategic-type players. However, the possibility that the other player is such a
behavioral type could induce even some of these valuation types of the strategic-type players
to express a keenness to trade in the cheap-talk stage in the hope that the behavioral-type
of the other player would interpret this message to mean “lets coordinate on bidding less
aggressively” and thus be deceived into bidding “less aggressively”. Such strategic deception
could therefore increase the probability of trade among the strategic types. Our model
formalizes this idea.
The bargaining model in this paper is a 1
2
-double auction preceded by a cheap-talk stage.
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In the cheap-talk stage, the players (a buyer and a seller) choose to say either “Keen” or
“Not Keen”. Each player can have one of the two dispositions, strategic type or behavioral
type. The valuations of both the players irrespective of their disposition types are distributed
uniformly on [0, 1]. The behavioral types always announce “Keen” in the cheap-talk stage
and walk away from trade if they hear the “Not Keen” announcement. If a behavioral type
hears the “Keen” announcement from the other player, then she bids according to the C-S*
equilibrium strategy.
The assumption about the behavior of the behavioral types is motivated by the above
mentioned experimental results that confirm that the players play the C-S equilibrium strate-
gies when they are not allowed to communicate. Since the set of equilibrium strategies of the
1
2
-double auction with uniform priors is uncountable,5 these experiments suggest that the
C-S* equilibrium might be focal for the players. If the players are allowed limited communi-
cation opportunities like in the model outlined above, it is possible that the C-S* equilibrium
outcome remains focal for some players since in their mind the game with such limited com-
munication opportunities is not really different from the one without communication. Hence,
the behavioral-type players play the C-S* strategies, but only if they hear the “right” mes-
sage of “Keen”. The behavioral-type players thus use the cheap-talk stage to coordinate on
a bidding behavior that generates the C-S* equilibrium outcome.
We show that if the probability that a player is a behavioral type is at least 11%, then in an
equilibrium, the ex-ante probability of trade in the event that both players are strategic type
is strictly higher than the ex-ante probability of trade in the C-S* equilibrium. Moreover,
the ex-ante probability of trade in the event that both players are strategic type is strictly
higher than the ex-ante probability of trade in the F-G equilibrium as long as the probability
of a player being a behavioral type is positive.
In equilibrium, a strategic-type player faces a trade-off in the cheap-talk stage between
a higher probability of trade and a better price in the bargaining stage. Whereas the “Not
Keen” announcement gives a better price in the bargaining stage, it also reduces the proba-
bility of trade. When the probability of any player being a behavioral type is 0, large intervals
of valuation types of the strategic-type players announce “Not Keen” in equilibrium. This
leads to a lower probability of trade than that in the C-S* equilibrium. However, with an
increase in the probability of a player being a behavioral type, announcing “Keen” becomes
5For instance, all valuation types of both the players bidding any price in the interval [0, 1] as long as
it is individually rational for them to trade at that price is an equilibrium. Leininger et al. (1989) study
the class of step-function equilibria and Satterthwaite and Williams (1989) study the class of differentiable
equilibria of the k-double auction.
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more attractive to some valuation types of the strategic-type players who were earlier an-
nouncing “Not Keen”. Now the “Keen” announcement offers these strategic-type players
both a higher probability of trade and a better price when they trade with the behavioral
types. This is because a positive measure of valuation types of the behavioral-type players
bid “less aggressively” than their strategic counterparts in the continuation game follow-
ing the “Keen” announcement by both players. Hence, hoping that the other player is a
behavioral type who would be deceived into interpreting a “Keen” announcement as “lets
coordinate on the C-S* equilibrium bids”, more valuation types of the strategic-type players
announce “Keen”. As the probability of a player being a behavioral type increases, the set
of valuation types of the strategic-type players announcing “Keen” increases monotonically.
As a result, the probability of trade between the strategic types also increases monotonically
and after the probability of a player being a behavioral type crosses the threshold of 11%, it
is strictly higher than the probability of trade in the C-S* equilibrium.
Three points must be emphasized. First, in the setup analyzed by Myerson and Sat-
terthwaite (1983), it is theoretically impossible to achieve a higher probability of trade than
that in the C-S* equilibrium. In their setup, both the players are strategic type and the
only incomplete information is with respect to the valuation types of the players. We add
uncertainty regarding the behavioral-type players to that setup and therefore it becomes
possible to increase the probability of trade among the strategic-type players. Secondly, to
increase the probability of trade among the strategic types it is necessary that the behavioral
types do not shade/exaggerate too much or too little in the bargaining stage. “Aggressive”
bidding by the behavioral types will not induce the strategic types to say “Keen” whereas
if the behavioral types bid very close to their valuations then that will induce the strategic
types to become “aggressive” following a “Keen” announcement by both players, which will
reduce the probability of trade among the strategic types. Finally, our model shows that
if pre-play cheap-talk is used by the behavioral-types to coordinate their play – which the
experiments suggest is indeed the case – then the strategic-type players will not always use
the pre-play cheap-talk to credibly signal their private information; instead, some strategic
types will use talk to “masquerade” themselves as behavioral type in order to exploit other
behavioral-type players.
Several papers have added uncertainty regarding the behavior of players to explain ob-
served phenomena. Kreps et al. (1982) show that players can cooperate for some periods
even in a finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma if there exists a possibility that a player is a
“Tit-for-Tat” type. Kreps and Wilson (1982) explain predatory practices by firms by adding
5
uncertainty regarding the type of the incumbent firm whereas Milgrom and Roberts (1982)
explain the same phenomenon by adding uncertainty regarding the behavior pattern of the
incumbent firm. Sobel (1985) studies the influence of honest types in a model of strate-
gic information transmission and Abreu and Gul (2000) study how introducing “irrational”
types affects bargaining outcomes. Unlike these papers, we do not deal with the issue of
the strategic-type players trying to behave like the behavioral-type players in order to build
a reputation over a repeated interaction. The only opportunity to imitate the behavioral
types is provided in the cheap-talk stage and, as explained above, some valuation types of
the strategic-type players use that opportunity to “masquerade” themselves as behavioral
type in order to gain both a better price and a higher probability of trade in the bargaining
stage.
We outline the model and solve for the equilibrium in Section 2. We conclude in the
third section and relegate proofs to the Appendix.
2 Model
There are two players, a buyer (denoted by b) and a seller (denoted by s). The seller owns
an indivisible object that she would like to trade with the buyer. The players trade using
a 1
2
-double auction with a pre-play cheap-talk stage. In the cheap-talk stage, the players
simultaneously announce either “Keen” or “Not Keen”. If both players announce “Not
Keen” then there is no trade.6 If at least one player announces “Keen” then the players
play the 1
2
-double auction. In the 1
2
-double auction, both players simultaneously bid for the
object. The object is traded if and only if the buyer’s bid is at least as high as the seller’s
bid at a price equal to the average of both the bids. Denote the valuations of the buyer and
seller by vb and vs, respectively, and the bids of the buyer and seller by tb and ts, respectively.
The buyer’s payoff is vb − 12(tb + ts), while the seller’s payoff is 12(tb + ts)− vs. Both players
get a payoff of 0 if the good is not traded.
A player can have one of the two dispositions, behavioral (denoted by bh) and strategic
(denoted by st). The probability that a player is a behavioral type is , which is independent
of the valuation and disposition types of the other player. The valuations of both disposition
types of a player are distributed uniformly on [0, 1] and are also independent of the other
6As mentioned by Farrell and Gibbons (1989), this could be because the players get sufficiently discouraged
after such announcements and do not show up to bargain in the next stage or that they hold pessimistic
beliefs and play the no-trade equilibrium. Note that the players play the no-trade equilibrium because they
are pessimistic not about the distributions of valuations but about the distributions of bids.
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player’s valuation and disposition. Each player privately knows her type (valuation and
disposition) but does not know the true type of the other player. The probability  and the
distributions of valuations of the players are common knowledge.
The behavioral types of both the buyer and seller always announce “Keen” in the com-
munication stage. In the continuation game following the “Not Keen” announcement by the
buyer (seller), the behavioral-type seller (buyer) is extremely pessimistic about the buyer
(seller) and therefore bids 1 (0) irrespective of her valuation. In the continuation game fol-
lowing the “Keen” announcement by the buyer, the behavioral-type seller with valuation
below 3
4
bids 2
3
vs +
1
4
and the other behavioral types of the seller bid equal to their valua-
tions. Finally, in the continuation game following the “Keen” announcement by the seller,
the behavioral-type buyer with valuation above 1
4
bids 2
3
vb +
1
12
and the other behavioral
types of the buyer bid equal to their valuations. This behavior of the behavioral types is
also common knowledge.
Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) focus on a pair of linear strategies that is an equilib-
rium of the 1
2
-double auction when both players are strategic type and their valuations are
distributed independently and uniformly. The following theorem is a restatement of their
result.
Theorem 0 (Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983)) Suppose the valuations of the buyer
and seller are distributed independently and uniformly on [vb, v¯b] and [vs, v¯s], respectively. If
2
3
vb +
1
12
v¯b +
1
4
vs <
2
3
v¯s +
1
4
v¯b +
1
12
vs, then the following bidding strategies are an equilibrium
of the 1
2
-double auction:
1. Any valuation type of the buyer with valuation such that 2
3
vb +
1
12
v¯b +
1
4
vs <
3
4
vs +
1
4
v¯b bids equal to her valuation. All other valuation types of the buyer bid equal to
min
{
2
3
vb +
1
12
v¯b +
1
4
vs,
2
3
v¯s +
1
4
v¯b +
1
12
vs
}
.
2. Any valuation type of the seller with valuation such that 2
3
vs +
1
4
v¯b +
1
12
vs >
1
4
vs +
3
4
v¯b bids equal to her valuation. All other valuation types of the seller bid equal to
max{2
3
vs +
1
4
v¯b +
1
12
vs,
2
3
vb +
1
12
v¯b +
1
4
vs}.
We refer to the equilibrium described in Theorem 0 as the C-S equilibrium. When the
valuations of the players are distributed uniformly and independently on [0, 1], then we
refer to the particular C-S equilibrium as the C-S* equilibrium. It is easy to see that the
behavioral-type player in this paper bids according to the C-S* equilibrium strategy when
the other player announces “Keen”.
We restrict attention to a set of equilibria that we term as Monotonic-Symmetric.
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Definition 1 In aMonotonic-Symmetric equilibrium, all valuation types of the strategic-
type buyer with valuations above y say “Keen” and all other valuation types of the strategic-
type buyer say “Not Keen” whereas all valuation types of the strategic-type seller with val-
uations below (1− y) say “Keen” and all other valuation types of the strategic-type seller
say “Not Keen”.
Monotonicity in equilibrium has the appeal that the “Keen” announcement is used by
the players to communicate their keenness to trade and hence high valuation types of the
strategic-type buyer and low valuation types of the strategic-type seller send “Keen” mes-
sages. The motivation behind the symmetric requirement in equilibrium is the symmetry of
the game.
Farrell and Gibbons (1989) study the model outlined above when  = 0, that is, when both
the players are only strategic type (We term it the F-G model). With only the strategic types,
there always exist a babbling equilibrium in which talk is ignored. However, an immediate
consequence of adding the behavioral types is that talk will never be ignored by the strategic
types in equilibrium. The “Not Keen” announcement implies that the player is a strategic
type whereas the “Keen” announcement implies that with probability greater than or equal
to , the player is a behavioral type. Therefore, there does not exist a babbling equilibrium
in the model with the behavioral types.
The information transmitted through talk is credible in a Monotonic-Symmetric equilib-
rium of the F-G model. In equilibrium, each claim has a precise meaning, “My valuation is
above (below) a”, because only a valuation type of a player with valuation above (below) a
claims that her valuation is above (below) a. However, in our model with the behavioral-
type players, only the message “Not Keen” is credible. Only the strategic-type buyer with
valuation below y and the strategic-type seller with valuation above 1 − y announce “Not
Keen” in equilibrium and thus the strategic-type of the other player can precisely interpret
this message. Information is not credibly revealed by the message “Keen” as it does not
have a precise meaning in equilibrium like before. Now, when the strategic-type seller hears
the message “Keen”, it can have two interpretations, either the buyer is behavioral type or
the buyer is strategic type with a valuation greater than y.
Farrell and Gibbons (1989) further restrict their analysis to a subset of the Monotonic-
Symmetric equilibria of the F-G model where the equilibrium strategies of the players in the
second-stage continuation games along the equilibrium path are restricted to equal the C-S
equilibrium strategies wherever possible; if not possible, then the strategies are restricted to
the one-step equilibrium strategies with price equal to 1
2
. We denote their restriction on the
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second-stage equilibrium strategies of the players by R and call an equilibrium of the F-G
model Monotonic-Symmetric-R if it is Monotonic-Symmetric and it satisfies R.
Farrell and Gibbons (1989) show that in the F-G model, there are two Monotonic-
Symmetric-R equilibria, one with y = 0 and other with y = 34+6
√
5
61
(We denote the latter
value by yFG and call the related equilibrium F-G equilibrium).7 The first equilibrium with
y = 0 has the same outcome as the C-S* equilibrium. In the second equilibrium, cheap
talk is credible and information is revealed. More importantly, in the Monotonic-Symmetric
equilibrium with y = yFG in the F-G model, the low valuation types of the buyer and the
high valuation types of the seller say “Not Keen” to show their disinclination to trade in
the hope of a better price in the ensuing 1
2
-double auction. In contrast, if  > 0, then as we
will see later in this section, some of these valuation types of the strategic-type players say
“Keen” because they want to deceive the behavioral-type players into coordinating on the
C-S* equilibrium.
In fact, there is another Monotonic-Symmetric-R equilibrium with y = 1 in the F-G
model.8 Here both players say “Not Keen” and have pessimistic beliefs if they hear “Keen”.
Notice that in this equilibrium there is no trade. In contrast, the following lemma shows
that the introduction of the behavioral types ensures that the strategic-type players always
trade with a positive probability in any Monotonic-Symmetric equilibrium outcome.
Lemma 1 If  > 0, there cannot exist a Monotonic-Symmetric equilibrium with the ex-ante
probability of trade in the event that both players are strategic type equal to 0.
Before we begin to analyze the model, let’s fix the notation. vi, di and ti, where i = b, s,
are respectively the valuation, the disposition and the bid of the player i. Let K stand for
“Keen” and NK stand for “Not Keen”. Let [mb,ms] denote the continuation game when the
buyer’s side has announcedmb and the seller’s side has announcedms, wheremi ∈ {K,NK}.
σi denotes the strategy of the strategic-type player i in a continuation game. Of course, the
7The equilibrium value of y reported by Farrell and Gibbons (1989) should be 34+6
√
5
61 ≈ 0.777318 instead
of 0.795. Also, there cannot exist a Monotonic-Symmetric-R equilibrium in the F-G model with y ∈ (0, 14 ]
because in the continuation game following the “Not Keen” announcement by the buyer and the “Keen”
announcement by the seller, the buyer with valuation y earns a strictly positive payoff, so that valuation
types of the buyer with valuations close enough but greater than y would prefer to say “Not Keen” since
their payoff from announcing “Keen” is strictly lower.
8Furthermore, symmetry in the cheap-talk stage is not a restriction in the F-G model. Define a Monotonic-
R equilibrium in which all valuation types of the buyer with valuations above xb say “Keen” and all other
valuation types of the buyer say “Not Keen” while all valuation types of the seller with valuations below
zs say “Keen” and all other valuation types of the seller say “Not Keen” and which satisfies the restriction
R. It can be shown that in the F-G model, the set of Monotonic-R equilibrium outcomes equals the set of
Monotonic-Symmetric-R equilibrium outcomes.
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domain of σi will differ in different continuation games. It should be clear from the context.
Let Gi denote the distribution of bids induced by σi. For a given strategy of player j, let
Ui(vi, [mb,ms]) be the expected payoff of the strategic-type player i with valuation type vi
in the continuation game [mb,ms] when she bids optimally in that continuation game and
let Ui(vi, [mb,ms] | dj) be the expected payoff of the strategic-type player i with valuation
type vi in the event that player j is of disposition type dj when she bids optimally in the
continuation game [mb,ms].
2.1 Equilibrium
We begin the analysis of the model by looking for a particular class of equilibria, termed as
Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗. This class of equilibria is a subset of the Monotonic-Symmetric
equilibria of the model where the strategies of the strategic-type players in the continuation
games along the equilibrium path are restricted according to the restriction R∗. R∗ is a gen-
eralization of the restriction R used by Farrell and Gibbons (1989) to prove the effectiveness
of cheap talk in bargaining. According to R∗, the strategies of the strategic-type players
in the [K,NK] or the [NK,K] continuation games are restricted to equal the C-S equilib-
rium strategies. Lemma 2 proves that it is indeed sequentially rational for the strategic-type
players to play the C-S equilibrium strategies in these continuation games.
Lemma 2 In the continuation game [K,NK] along a Monotonic-Symmetric equilibrium
path, it is sequentially rational for the strategic types to bid according to the C-S equilibrium
strategies of the 1
2
-double auction when the valuations of the buyer and seller are distributed
uniformly and independently on [y, 1] and [1− y, 1], respectively. Similarly, in the continua-
tion game [NK,K] along a Monotonic-Symmetric equilibrium path, it is sequentially rational
for the strategic types to bid according to the C-S equilibrium strategies of the 1
2
-double auc-
tion when the valuations of the buyer and seller are distributed uniformly and independently
on [0, y] and [0, 1− y], respectively.
Similarly, whenever possible, R∗ requires that the strategic-type players play the C-S
equilibrium strategies in the [K,K] continuation game along a Monotonic-Symmetric equi-
librium path. It is, however, not always sequentially rational for the strategic-type players to
play the C-S equilibrium strategies in this continuation game. Playing the C-S equilibrium
strategies is sequentially rational if and only if y ≤ 1
4
or 1
4
< y < 5
8
and  is small enough. In
all other cases, R∗ restricts the strategies of the strategic-type players in the [K,K] contin-
uation game to equal, if possible, “generalized” versions of the C-S equilibrium strategies; if
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not possible, the strategies equal “generalized” versions of the one-step equilibrium strategies
with price equal to 1
2
. Lemma 3 in the Appendix details these sequentially rational strate-
gies of the strategic-type players in the [K,K] continuation game. In this section, we list
only Part 3 of Lemma 3. This is because for small values of , all Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗
equilibria with y 6= 0 are such that y is greater than 5
8
(see Proposition 2).
Lemma 3 (Part 3 only, full version is in the Appendix) Consider the [K,K] con-
tinuation game along a Monotonic-Symmetric equilibrium path. Define ˜ = 
+(1−)(1−y) . If
y ≥ 5
8
and
(a) if  < 8(1−y)
17−8y , then it is sequentially rational for the strategic types to bid according
to the one-step equilibrium with price equal to 1
2
.
(b) if 8(1−y)
17−8y ≤  ≤ 8(1−y)16y−7 , then the following strategies for the strategic types are sequen-
tially rational:
• For the strategic-type buyer,
σb(vb) =
{
2
3
vb +
11
36
− 2
9˜
if vb ≥ 724 + 13˜
1
2
if y ≤ vb < 724 + 13˜
• For the strategic-type seller,
σs(vs) =
{
2
3
vs +
1
36
+ 2
9˜
if vs ≤ 1724 − 13˜
1
2
if 17
24
− 1
3˜
< vs ≤ 1− y
(c) if  > 8(1−y)
16y−7 , then the following strategies for the strategic types are sequentially
rational:
• For the strategic-type buyer, σb(vb) = 23vb + 1136 − 29˜ .
• For the strategic-type seller, σs(vs) = 23vs + 136 + 29˜ .
Figure 1 shows these sequentially rational strategies of the strategic types in the [K,K]
continuation game for different values of  in a Monotonic-Symmetric equilibrium with y > 5
8
.
These linear strategies converge to the C-S* equilibrium strategies as → 1 and converge to
the one-step equilibrium with price equal to 1
2
as → 0. If  = 0 and all valuation types of the
strategic-type seller are bidding equal to 1
2
, then it is sequentially rational for all valuation
types of the strategic-type buyer to bid 1
2
and vice versa. As  increases, the likelihood that
11
the other player is bidding according to the C-S* equilibrium strategy increases and thus it
is rational to bid closer to one’s C-S* equilibrium strategy.
Figure 1: Sequentially rational strategies for the strategic types in the [K,K] continuation
game for different values of  in a Monotonic-Symmetric Equilibrium with y > 5
8
.
We are ready to define a Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium.
Definition 2 An equilibrium of the model is called Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ if it is
Monotonic-Symmetric and if the strategies of the strategic types in the continuation games
along the equilibrium path are restricted to those in Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
A necessary condition for a Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium to exist is that the
strategic-type buyer with valuation y must be indifferent between saying “Keen” and “Not
Keen”. That is,
((1− )(1− y) + )Ub(y, [K,K]) + (1− )yUb(y, [K,NK]) = (1− )(1− y)Ub(y, [NK,K]).
12
This reduces to,
(1− ) [(1− y)Ub(y, [K,K] | st) + yUb(y, [K,NK])− (1− y)Ub(y, [NK,K])] (1)
+Ub(y, [K,K] | bh) = 0
To see this, first note that the equilibrium-payoff of the strategic-type buyer must be weakly
increasing in her valuation, otherwise a higher valuation type can deviate to the strategy of
a lower valuation type and get a strictly better payoff. Now, suppose that in equilibrium, the
strategic-type buyer with valuation y gets δ more by saying “Keen” than “Not Keen”. Then
all valuation types of the strategic-type buyer with valuations in (y− δ, y) will also prefer to
say “Keen”. This is because if after saying “Keen”, they bid equal to the strategic-type buyer
with valuation y then they get a strictly higher payoff than their respective equilibrium-
payoffs. Similarly, in equilibrium, the strategic-type seller with valuation 1 − y must be
indifferent between the two announcements. These conditions will be used repeatedly in the
proofs.
The next proposition proves that there always exists a Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equi-
librium. This equilibrium is such that all valuation types of both the strategic-type players
announce “Keen” in the cheap-talk stage and then play the C-S* equilibrium strategies in
the [K,K] continuation game. Thus, this equilibrium has the same outcome as the C-S*
equilibrium.
Proposition 1 For all  ≥ 0, there exists a Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium with
y = 0.
Since the Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium with y = 0 has the same outcome as
the C-S* equilibrium, we concentrate on the set of Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibria with
y 6= 0. The next proposition proves that for small , there indeed exists a Monotonic-
Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium with y 6= 0. Moreover, for each of those small , this equilibrium
is unique in the sense that there does not exist any other value of y 6= 0 which can be
sustained as a Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium for that . It also shows that the value
of y decreases as  increases in the interval (0,
244−36√5
829
), with y → yFG as  → 0 and
y → 5+
√
5
10
as → 244−36
√
5
829
.9
Proposition 2 For all  ∈ (0, 244−36
√
5
829
), there exists a unique y 6= 0 such that the game has
a Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium with y = y.
9 244−36
√
5
829 ≈ 0.197227 and 5+
√
5
10 ≈ 0.723607.
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2.2 Comparison of Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibria with C-S*
and F-G equilibria
If ex-ante there are no behavioral types, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) prove that the C-
S* equilibrium of the 1
2
-double auction attains both the highest ex-ante probability of trade
and the highest gains from trade relative to any equilibrium of any trading mechanism. In
the same setup, if the players trade using instead the F-G model, then the ex-ante probability
of trade in the F-G equilibrium is strictly lower than that in the C-S* equilibrium. We have
added uncertainty regarding the behavioral types to the F-G model and wish to study how
this uncertainty affects the behavior of the strategic types. Does the behavior of the strategic
types change so much so that in the event that both players are indeed strategic, they trade
more often than if ex-ante there were no behavioral types? To answer this question, we
compare the ex-ante probabilities of trade in the C-S* and F-G equilibria and the ex-ante
probability of trade in the event that both players are strategic type in the Monotonic-
Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium specified in Proposition 2.10
The ex-ante probability of trade in the C-S* equilibrium is 9
32
= 0.28125 and in the F-G
equilibrium it is 3
2
yFG(1− yFG), which is approximately 0.2596. A simple calculation shows
that for the Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium in Proposition 2, the ex-ante probability
of trade in the event that players are strategic type is given by 3
2
y(1− y).
Proposition 3 For all  ∈ (0, 244−36
√
5
829
), the unique Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium
with y 6= 0 has a higher ex-ante probability of trade in the event that both players are strategic
type than the ex-ante probability of trade in the F-G equilibrium.
Proof: In the Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium corresponding to such a value of , the
value y satisfies y < y
FG and y >
5+
√
5
10
> 1
2
. Therefore, 3
2
y(1− y) > 32yFG(1− yFG). 
When  = 0, all valuation types of the strategic-type buyer with valuations below yFG
announce “Not Keen” in equilibrium. However, as  becomes positive, though the strategic-
type seller is still bidding 1
2
in the [K,K] continuation game, now there exist valuation
types of the behavioral-type seller who bid strictly below 1
2
in that continuation game. This
induces some valuation types of the strategic-type buyer with valuations below yFG to say
“Keen”. Similarly, some valuation types of the strategic-type seller with valuations above
1− yFG now prefer to say “Keen”. More valuation types of the strategic-type players saying
10Another comparison could be of the ex-ante gains from trade. It can be shown that if  ' 0.1642,
then the ex-ante gains form trade in the event that both players are strategic type in the equilibrium in
Proposition 2 are greater than the ex-ante gains from trade in the C-S* equilibrium.
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“Keen” in the cheap-talk stage positively affects the probability of trade among the strategic
types in two ways. Firstly, the valuation types of the strategic-type players who change
their announcement from “Not Keen” to “Keen” as  becomes positive are able to trade
irrespective of the other side’s announcement whereas when  = 0, they could trade only if
the other side announced “Keen”. This increases the probability of trade among the strategic
types in all the three continuation games [K,K], [K,NK] and [NK,K]. Secondly, the
probability of trade in the [K,NK] and the [NK,K] continuation games further increases as
the strategic types adjust their sequentially rational strategies in these continuation games.11
These two positive effects are clearly seen in Figure 2, which shows the trading regions under
the C-S* equilibrium (labeled CS*-TR), F-G equilibrium (labeled FG-TR) and the trading
region under the equilibrium of Proposition 2 in the event that both players are strategic
type (labeled ST-TR). Therefore, the probability of trade among the strategic types is higher
than that in the F-G equilibrium as  becomes positive.
As  further increases in the interval (0, 244−36
√
5
829
), the value of y further decreases (see
the proof of Proposition 2). As more valuation types of the strategic-type players announce
“Keen” with each increase in , the ex-ante probability of trade among the strategic types
keeps increasing. Once  crosses the threshold of 11
101
, the ex-ante probability of trade among
the strategic types becomes strictly higher than the probability of trade in the C-S* equilib-
rium. These facts are listed in the next two propositions.
Proposition 4 If  < 11
101
, then the unique Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium with y 6= 0
has a lower ex-ante probability of trade in the event that both players are strategic type than
the ex-ante probability of trade in the C-S* equilibrium.
Proof: For  < 11
101
, y >
3
4
. This implies that 3
2
y(1− y) < 932 . 
Proposition 5 If 244−36
√
5
829
>  > 11
101
, then the unique Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium
with y 6= 0 has a higher ex-ante probability of trade in the event that both players are strategic
type than the ex-ante probability of trade in the C-S* equilibrium.
Proof:  > 11
101
=⇒ y < 34 =⇒ 32y(1− y) > 932 . 
The obvious question that now arises is, what can we say when  ≥ 244−36
√
5
829
? We know
from Proposition 1 that there always exists a Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium with
y = 0. Also, in that equilibrium, all strategic types bid according to the C-S* equilibrium
11The strategic types do not adjust their bids in the [K,K] continuation game and continue to bid 12 . This
is because for all  ∈ (0, 244−36
√
5
829 ),  <
8(1−y)
17−8y . See the proof of Proposition 2 for details.
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Figure 2: A comparison of various trading regions.
strategies, and hence, the ex-ante probability of trade in the event that both players are
strategic type in that equilibrium is the same as the ex-ante probability of trade in the C-S*
equilibrium. We prove in the next proposition that if  ∈ [244−36
√
5
829
, 1), then any Monotonic-
Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium with y 6= 0 must have a strictly higher ex-ante probability of trade
among the strategic types than the ex-ante probability of trade in the C-S* equilibrium.12
Proposition 6 For  ∈ [244−36
√
5
829
, 1), any Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium with y 6= 0
has a higher ex-ante probability of trade in the event that both players are strategic type than
the ex-ante probability of trade in the C-S* equilibrium.
12Though it needs to be proved, we conjecture that for such a large value of , there exists a Monotonic-
Symmetric-R∗ with y 6= 0. From the proof of Proposition 2, we can see that for small values of , there is
a one-to-one relation between  and y. This is not surprising given the necessary condition (1). Hence, we
expect that this will also hold for large values of .
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Corollary 1 For  ∈ [244−36
√
5
829
, 1), any Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium has at least
as high ex-ante probability of trade in the event that both players are strategic type as the
ex-ante probability of trade in the C-S* equilibrium.
Proof : Follows from Proposition 6 and the fact that the ex-ante probability of trade among
the strategic types in the Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium with y = 0 is the same as
the probability of trade in the C-S* equilibrium. 
Corollary 2 For all  > 0, any Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium has a strictly higher
ex-ante probability of trade in the event both players are strategic type than the ex-ante
probability of trade in the F-G equilibrium.
Proof : Follows from Proposition 3 and Proposition 6 and the fact that the ex-ante proba-
bility of trade among the strategic types in the Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium with
y = 0 is the same as the probability of trade in the C-S* equilibrium. 
3 Conclusion
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) prove that it is impossible to attain a higher probability
of trade than that in the C-S* equilibrium outcome of the 1
2
-double auction. Farrell and
Gibbons (1989) show that pre-play cheap talk leads to effective communication but does
not improve the probability of trade since some valuation types use talk to credibly signal
their disinclination to trade in the hope of a better price in the double auction. We intro-
duced behavioral-type players into a 1
2
-double auction with pre-play communication. The
behavioral-type players use the pre-play cheap talk to coordinate on bidding “less aggres-
sively” than their strategic counterparts – in fact such non-strategic behavior is observed
in experiments. The behavioral types thus bid “less aggressively” if and only if both play-
ers express a keenness to trade. This changes the incentives of some strategic-type players.
Instead of using cheap-talk to credibly signal their disinclination to trade, some strategic-
type players imitate the behavioral types in the cheap-talk stage in the hope that the other
player is a behavioral type who would then be deceived into coordinating on bidding “less
aggressively”. These strategic types thus now express a keenness to trade, which improves
the probability of trade among the strategic type players. If the probability that a player is
behavioral type is high enough, the probability of trade among the strategic types is higher
than that in the C-S* equilibrium outcome.
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Appendix
We provide proofs for only one player to avoid repetition.
Proof of Lemma 1: First, we prove that y < 1 in any Monotonic-Symmetric equilibrium.
Suppose otherwise. Then, for all valuation types of the strategic-type buyer with valuations
greater than 1
4
, it is better to deviate in the first stage and say “Keen” because they trade
with a positive probability with the behavioral-type seller by announcing “Keen” whereas
they get 0 by saying “Not Keen”.
Second, consider the continuation game following the “Keen” announcements by both
players. In this continuation game, any valuation type of a strategic-type player who does not
trade with the strategic type of the other player must bid according to the C-S* equilibrium
strategy because her bid maximizes her expected payoff given that she could trade only with
the behavioral type of the other player. For instance, the expected payoff of the strategic-
type buyer with valuation vb who bids tb such that she does not trade with the strategic-type
seller equals

+ (1− )(1− y)
∫
[0,tb]
(
vb − 1
2
(tb + ts)
)
dG˜s(ts)
where G˜s is the distribution of bids induced by the behavioral-type seller in the continuation
game. Then, it is optimal for this strategic-type buyer to bid according to the C-S* strategy
since the behavioral-type seller bids according to the C-S* strategy. So if no positive measure
of the strategic-type players trade in this continuation game, all the strategic-type players
must bid according to the C-S* strategy. But that leads to a contradiction since according
to the C-S* strategy, the valuation types of the strategic-type buyer with valuations near 1
bid strictly higher than the valuation types of the strategic-type seller with valuations near
0.
Therefore, in any Monotonic-Symmetric equilibrium, a positive measure of valuation
types of the strategic-type players announce “Keen” and in the continuation game following
the “Keen” announcements by both players, the probability of trade among the strategic-
type players is positive. 
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Proof of Lemma 2: Suppose along a Monotonic-Symmetric equilibrium path, the buyer’s
side announces “Keen” and the seller’s side announces “Not Keen”. Then, it is common
knowledge among the strategic-type players that the valuations of the strategic-type buyer
and the strategic-type seller are distributed uniformly on [y, 1] and [1− y, 1] respectively.
The strategic-type buyer knows that the seller is strategic type since the seller announced
“Not Keen”. Hence, if the strategic-type seller bids according to the C-S equilibrium strategy,
it is optimal for the strategic-type buyer to also bid according to the C-S equilibrium strategy.
The behavioral-type buyer will bid 0 and so the probability that the strategic-type seller
trades with the behavioral-type buyer is 0. Hence, when the strategic-type seller chooses
a bid, she maximizes her expected payoff from trading only with the strategic-type buyer.
Therefore, if the strategic-type buyer uses the C-S equilibrium strategy, then the expected
payoff of the strategic-type seller with valuation vs who bids ts equals,(
1− 
+ (1− )(1− y)
)∫
[ts,1]
(
1
2
(tb + ts)− vs
)
dGb(tb).
Since the constant is irrelevant in determining the optimal bid, it is also optimal for the
strategic-type seller to bid according to the C-S equilibrium strategy. A similar argument
completes the proof when the seller’s side announces “Keen” and the buyer’s side announces
“Not Keen”. 
Lemma 3 Consider the [K,K] continuation game along a Monotonic-Symmetric equilib-
rium path. Define ˜ = 
+(1−)(1−y) .
1. If y ≤ 1
4
, then it is sequentially rational for the strategic types to bid according to the
C-S equilibrium strategies of the 1
2
-double auction when the valuations of the buyer and
seller are distributed uniformly and independently on [y, 1] and [0, 1− y] respectively.
2. If 1
4
< y < 5
8
and
(a) if  < 4(1−y)
8y+1
, then it is sequentially rational for the strategic types to bid according
to the C-S equilibrium strategies of the 1
2
-double auction when the valuations of the
buyer and seller are distributed uniformly and independently on [y, 1] and [0, 1−y]
respectively.
(b) if  ≥ 4(1−y)
8y+1
, then the following strategies are sequentially rational:13
13Note that 1112 +
1
3˜ − y ≤ 1 ⇐⇒ y + 112 − 13˜ ≥ 0 ⇐⇒  ≥ 4(1−y)8y+1 . Also, 1112 + 13˜ − y ≥ 54 − y ⇐⇒
y + 112 − 13˜ ≤ y − 14 ⇐⇒ ˜ ≤ 1 ⇐⇒  ≤ 1.
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• For the strategic-type buyer,
σb(vb) =

2
3
vb +
1
12
if vb ≤ 54 − y
2
3
(1− y) + 1
4
if 5
4
− y ≤ vb ≤ 1112 + 13˜ − y
2
3
vb +
11
36
− 2
9˜
if vb ≥ 1112 + 13˜ − y
• For the strategic-type seller,
σs(vs) =

2
3
vs +
1
36
+ 2
9˜
if vs ≤ y + 112 − 13˜
2
3
y + 1
12
if y + 1
12
− 1
3˜
≤ vs ≤ y − 14
2
3
vs +
1
4
if vs ≥ y − 14
3. If y ≥ 5
8
and
(a) if  < 8(1−y)
17−8y , then it is sequentially rational for the strategic types to bid according
to the one-step equilibrium with price equal to 1
2
.
(b) if 8(1−y)
17−8y ≤  ≤ 8(1−y)16y−7 , then the following strategies for the strategic types are
sequentially rational:14
• For the strategic-type buyer,
σb(vb) =
{
2
3
vb +
11
36
− 2
9˜
if vb ≥ 724 + 13˜
1
2
if y ≤ vb < 724 + 13˜
• For the strategic-type seller,
σs(vs) =
{
2
3
vs +
1
36
+ 2
9˜
if vs ≤ 1724 − 13˜
1
2
if 17
24
− 1
3˜
< vs ≤ 1− y
(c) if  > 8(1−y)
16y−7 , then the following strategies for the strategic types are sequentially
rational:
• For the strategic-type buyer, σb(vb) = 23vb + 1136 − 29˜ .
• For the strategic-type seller, σs(vs) = 23vs + 136 + 29˜ .
Proof :
14Note that (1 − y) ≥ 1724 − 13˜ ⇐⇒ 724 + 13˜ ≥ y ⇐⇒  ≤ 8(1−y)16y−7 . Also, 724 + 13˜ ≤ 1 ⇐⇒ 1724 − 13˜ ≥
0 ⇐⇒  ≥ 8(1−y)17−8y . Finally, 8(1−y)16y−7 ≥ 8(1−y)17−8y ∀y ≥ 58 .
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1. y ≤ 1
4
The C-S strategies are:
• For the strategic-type buyer,
σb(vb) =
{
2
3
vb +
1
12
if vb ≥ 14
vb if vb <
1
4
• For the strategic-type seller,
σs(vs) =
{
2
3
vs +
1
4
if vs ≤ 34
vs if vs >
3
4
Let G˜s denote the distribution of bids induced by the strategy of the behavioral-type
seller. Then, the strategic-type buyer’s belief about the distribution of the seller’s bid
ts is:
• With probability 1− ˜, the seller is strategic type and therefore,
Gs(ts) =
{
3
2(1−y)(ts − 14) if 14 ≤ ts ≤ 34
ts
1−y if
3
4
≤ ts ≤ 1− y
• With probability ˜, the seller is behavioral type and therefore,
G˜s(ts) =
{
3
2
(ts − 14) if 14 ≤ ts ≤ 34
ts if
3
4
≤ ts ≤ 1
No valuation type of the strategic-type buyer will bid tb > 1 − y. Of course, for any
valuation type of the strategic-type buyer, a bid greater than 1 is strictly dominated
by the bid equal to 1. The expected payoff of the strategic-type buyer who bids
tb ∈ (1− y, 1] is
(1− ˜)
(
vb − 1
2
tb − 1
2
∫
[ 1
4
,1−y]
tsdGs
)
+ ˜
∫
[ 1
4
,tb]
(
vb − 1
2
(tb + ts)
)
dG˜s.
The derivative of the above expression with respect to tb is −(1 − ˜)12 + ˜(vb − 32tb),
which is negative for all vb since tb > 1− y ≥ 34 > 23vb.
21
If ts ≤ 1 − y, the two distributions Gs and G˜s are the same up to a positive con-
stant 1
1−y . Since the strategic-type buyer bids tb ≤ 1 − y, her expected payoff is(
1−˜
1−y + ˜
) ∫
[ 1
4
,tb]
(
vb − 12(tb + ts)
)
dG˜s. The positive constant
(
1−˜
1−y + ˜
)
is irrelevant in
determining the optimal bid and we know that when facing a bid distribution G˜s, it is
optimal for the strategic-type buyer to bid according to the C-S strategy given above.
2. 5
8
> y > 1
4
(a) Suppose  < 4(1−y)
8y+1
. We prove that the C-S strategies given below are sequentially
rational.
• For the strategic-type buyer,
σb(vb) =
{
2
3
vb +
1
12
if vb ≤ 54 − y
2
3
(1− y) + 1
4
if vb ≥ 54 − y
• For the strategic-type seller,
σs(vs) =
{
2
3
y + 1
12
if vs ≤ y − 14
2
3
vs +
1
4
if vs ≥ y − 14
Now the strategic-type buyer’s belief about the distribution of the seller’s bid is:
• With probability 1− ˜ the seller is strategic type and therefore,
Gs(ts) =

0 if ts <
2
3
y + 1
12
y− 1
4
1−y if ts =
2
3
y + 1
12
3
2(1−y)(ts − 14) if 23y + 112 < ts ≤ 23(1− y) + 14
• With probability ˜, ts has the distribution function G˜s.
The expected payoff of the strategic-type buyer is ˜
∫
[ 1
4
,tb]
(
vb − 12(tb + ts)
)
dG˜s
when tb <
2
3
y+ 1
12
. Therefore, the optimal bid for the strategic-type buyer equals
her C-S bid, which is 2
3
vb +
1
12
. However, 2
3
vb +
1
12
≥ 2
3
y + 1
12
, a contradiction.
Hence, all valuation types of the strategic-type buyer bid at least 2
3
y + 1
12
.
If tb ≥ 23(1− y) + 14 , then the first order condition is,
−1
2
+ ˜
(
3
2
vb − 9
4
tb +
11
16
)
≤ 0 (2)
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When the above condition holds with a strict inequality, the constraint must bind.
Note that if this is true for the strategic-type buyer with valuation equal to 1,
then it must also be true for all valuation types of the strategic-type buyer with
valuations less than 1. To ensure that the highest valuation type of the strategic-
type buyer bids 2
3
(1− y) + 1
4
we must have, −1
2
+ ˜
(
3
2
− 9
4
(
2
3
(1− y) + 1
4
)
+ 11
16
)
<
0 ⇐⇒ ˜ < 4
12y+1
⇐⇒  < 4(1−y)
8y+1
. Hence, when  < 4(1−y)
8y+1
, all valuation types of
the strategic-type buyer bid at most 2
3
(1− y) + 1
4
.
If tb is such that
2
3
y + 1
12
≤ tb ≤ 23(1− y) + 14 , then the first order condition is,
3
2
(
1−˜
1−y + ˜
) (
vb − 32tb + 18
)
= λ1 − λ2
where λ1 and λ2 are the respective Lagrange multipliers for the two constraints,
tb ≤ 23(1−y)+ 14 and 23y+ 112 ≤ tb. It is now easy to conclude that ∀vb ∈ [y, 54−y],
bidding 2
3
vb +
1
12
is optimal.
(b) Suppose  ≥ 4(1−y)
8y+1
. The belief of the strategic-type buyer about the distribution
of the seller’s bid under the strategy specified in the lemma is:
• With probability 1− ˜,
Gs(ts) =

0 if ts <
1
36
+ 2
9˜
3
2(1−y)(ts − 136 − 29˜) if 136 + 29˜ ≤ ts < 23y + 112
y− 1
4
1−y if ts =
2
3
y + 1
12
3
2(1−y)(ts − 14) if 23y + 112 ≤ ts ≤ 23(1− y) + 14
• With probability ˜, ts has the distribution function G˜s.
Using arguments similar to those provided for proving part 2(a), it can be shown
that no valuation type of the strategic-type buyer will ever bid below 2
3
y+ 1
12
and
if the strategic-type buyer bids below 2
3
(1− y) + 1
4
, then she will bid 2
3
vb +
1
12
. If
the strategic-type buyer bids above 2
3
(1− y) + 1
4
, then the first order condition is
the same as (2) and therefore she will bid 2
3
vb +
11
36
− 2
9˜
. One can also show that
only valuation types of the strategic-type buyer with valuations above 11
12
+ 1
3˜
− y
bid above 2
3
(1 − y) + 1
4
and all valuation types of the strategic-type buyer with
valuations below 5
4
− y bid below 2
3
(1− y) + 1
4
.
3. y ≥ 5
8
23
(a) Suppose  < 8(1−y)
17−8y . We prove that it is sequentially rational for the strategic-type
players to bid according to the one-step equilibrium with price equal to 1
2
.
Given this strategy for the strategic-type seller, the strategic-type buyer’s belief
about the distribution of the seller’s bid is:
• With probability 1− ˜, ts = 12 .
• With probability ˜, ts has the distribution function G˜s.
If the strategic-type buyer bids less than 1
2
, then she can trade with only the
behavioral-type seller. Then, since the behavioral-type seller bids according to
the C-S* strategy, it is optimal for the strategic-type buyer to also bid according
to the C-S* strategy, which is 2
3
vb +
1
12
. However, 2
3
vb +
1
12
is less than 1
2
only if
vb <
5
8
. Hence, bidding below 1
2
is never a best response.
If the strategic-type buyer bids tb ≥ 12 , then the first order condition is the same
as (2). Reasoning as in part 2(a) above, we get that all valuation types of the
strategic-type buyer will bid equal to 1
2
when  < 8(1−y)
17−8y .
(b) Suppose 8(1−y)
17−8y ≤  ≤ 8(1−y)16y−7 . Given the strategies specified in the lemma, the
belief of the strategic-type buyer about the distribution of the seller’s bid is:
• With probability 1− ˜ the seller is strategic type and therefore,
Gs(ts) =

0 if ts <
1
36
+ 2
9˜
3
2(1−y)(ts − 136 − 29˜) if 136 + 29˜ ≤ ts < 12
1 if ts =
1
2
• With probability ˜, ts has the distribution function G˜s.
With these beliefs, it is easy to show that since vb ≥ 58 , no valuation type of the
strategic-type buyer will bid below 1
2
. If the strategic-type buyer bids tb ≥ 12 , then
the first order condition is again the same as (2) and it can be easily checked that
the strategy specified above is indeed the solution.
(c) Proof is similar to the proof of part 3(b). 
Proof of Proposition 1: If all valuation types of the strategic-type players announce
“Keen”, then in the [K,K] continuation game, it is sequentially rational for the strategic
types to bid according to the C-S* equilibrium strategy as proved in Part 1 of Lemma 3.
Any continuation game following the “Not Keen” announcement by one of the players is
24
off-the-equilibrium path. In such a continuation game, it is sequentially rational for the
strategic-type players to walk away from trade. Given these strategies in the continuation
games, it is optimal for all valuation types of the strategic-type players to announce “Keen”
in the cheap-talk stage. 
We need the following two lemmas before proving that for small  there exists a unique
Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium with y 6= 0.
Lemma 4 If  < 1, then there does not exist a Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium with
y ∈ (0, 1
4
].
Proof: Suppose  < 1 and there exists a Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium with y ∈
(0, 1
4
]. Then Ub(y, [K,K]) = Ub(y, [K,NK]) = 0, since in both the continuation games,
the strategic-type buyer with valuation equal to y trades with probability 0. Whereas,
Ub(y, [NK,K]) > 0 since in this continuation game, the strategic-type buyer with valuation
y trades with a positive probability. This contradicts the necessary condition (1). 
Lemma 5 Suppose for some  there exists a Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium with 1
4
<
y < 5
8
. Then  ≥ 4(1−y)
8y+1
.
Proof: Suppose  < 4(1−y)
8y+1
and 1
4
< y ≤ 4
7
. Applying Lemma 2 and Part 2(a) of Lemma 3
we get that,
• Ub(y, [K,K] | st) = (y−
1
4
)2
3(1−y) .
• Ub(y, [K,NK]) = 0.
• Ub(y, [NK,K]) = (y−
y
4
)2
2(1−y) .
• Ub(y, [K,K] | bh) = 12(y − 14)2.
Putting these values in (1) and solving for , we get:
 =
1
2
(y − y
4
)2 − 1
3
(y − 1
4
)2
1
6
(y − 1
4
)2 + 1
2
(y − y
4
)2
.
But this value of  is greater than 4(1−y)
8y+1
for y satisfying the inequality 1
4
< y ≤ 4
7
.
Suppose  < 4(1−y)
8y+1
and 4
7
< y < 5
8
. Again, applying Lemma 2 and Part 2(a) of Lemma 3
we get that,
• Ub(y, [K,K] | st) = (y−
1
4
)2
3(1−y) .
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• Ub(y, [K,NK]) = (
7y
4
−1)2
3y
.
• Ub(y, [NK,K]) = (5y4 − 12).
• Ub(y, [K,K] | bh) = 12(y − 14)2.
Again, putting these values in (1) and solving for , we get:
 =
1
3
(y − 1
4
)2 + 1
3
(7y
4
− 1)2 − (1− y)(5y
4
− 1
2
)
1
3
(y − 1
4
)2 + 1
3
(7y
4
− 1)2 − (1− y)(5y
4
− 1
2
)− 1
2
(y − 1
4
)2
.
But this value of  is greater than 4(1−y)
8y+1
for y satisfying the inequality 4
7
< y < 5
8
. 
Proof of Proposition 2: Pick an  ∈ (0, 244−36
√
5
829
). From Lemma 4, we know that for this
, there cannot exist a Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium with 0 < y ≤ 1
4
. Also, this
value of  is less than 4(1−y)
8y+1
∀ y s.t. 1
4
< y < 5
8
. Hence, from Lemma 5, there cannot exist a
Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium with y such that 1
4
< y < 5
8
.
Suppose for this value of  there exists a Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium with y ≥ 5
8
and 8(1−y)
17−8y ≤  ≤ 8(1−y)16y−7 . Since 8(1−y)17−8y ≥ 244−36
√
5
829
for y such that 5
8
≤ y ≤ 5+
√
5
10
, it must be
the case that y > 5+
√
5
10
. For such a y to be a Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium, it must
satisfy the necessary condition (1), which in this case reduces to:
(1− )
(
y − 55
144
− + (1− )(1− y)
18
)(
17
24
− + (1− )(1− y)
3
)
+(1− )
((
y − 1
2
)(
7
24
+
+ (1− )(1− y)
3
− y
)
− (1− y)
(
5y
4
− 1
2
))
+
(1− )
3
(
7y
4
− 1
)2
+
3
8
(
y − 7
16
)
= 0. (3)
It can, however, be shown that there does not exist a y > 5+
√
5
10
with 8(1−y)
17−8y ≤  that satisfies
the above necessary condition.
Finally, suppose that for this value of  there exists a Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equi-
librium with y ≥ 5
8
and  > 8(1−y)
16y−7 . The necessary condition for such a value of y to be a
Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium is:
(1− )
(
1
3
(1− y)
(
5y
2
− 1
)
+
1
3
(
7y
4
− 1
)2
− (1− y)
(
5y
4
− 1
2
))
(4)
+

2
(
y − 7
12
+
+ (1− )(1− y)
3
)(
y +
1
12
− + (1− )(1− y)
3
)
= 0.
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Again, it can be shown that there does not exist a y ≥ 5
8
that satisfies the necessary condition
and also  > 8(1−y)
16y−7 .
Therefore, if there exists a Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium with y 6= 0 for  ∈
(0, 244−36
√
5
829
), it must be such that y ≥ 5
8
and  < 8(1−y)
17−8y . Under these conditions, y must
solve the necessary condition (1), which is now,
 =
(y − 1
2
)(1− y) + 1
3
(7y
4
− 1)2 − (1− y)(5y
4
− 1
2
)
(y − 1
2
)(1− y) + 1
3
(7y
4
− 1)2 − (1− y)(5y
4
− 1
2
)− 3
8
(y − 7
16
)
The right-hand side of the above equation is a continuous and strictly decreasing function
for y ∈ [5
8
, 1]. Also, the right-hand side converges to 244−36
√
5
829
as y → 5+
√
5
10
and to 0 as
y → 34+6
√
5
61
. Hence ∀  ∈ (0, 244−36
√
5
829
), there exists a unique y that solves the above
condition. It is easy to check that  < 8(1−y)
17−8y . Therefore, there can exist at most one
Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium with y 6= 0 for this value of .
Now we prove that for this  we have a Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium with y = y.
Consider the following strategies (We are not specifying the off-the-equilibrium path bids
of the strategic types since the proof does not require their exact values.):
1. For the strategic-type buyer:
• In the cheap-talk stage say “Keen” if vb ≥ y; otherwise, say “Not Keen”.
• In the continuation game [K,K], if vb ≥ y, then bid 12 .
• In the continuation game [K,NK], if vb ≥ y, then bid according to the C-S
equilibrium strategy for the 1
2
-double auction when the valuations of the buyer
and seller are distributed uniformly and independently on [y, 1] and [1 − y, 1]
respectively.
• In the continuation game [NK,K], if vb < y, then bid according to the C-S
equilibrium strategy for the 1
2
-double auction when the valuations of the buyer
and seller are distributed uniformly and independently on [0, y] and [0, 1 − y]
respectively.
2. For the strategic-type seller:
• In the cheap-talk stage say “Keen” if vs ≤ 1− y; otherwise, say “Not Keen”.
• In the continuation game [K,K], if vs ≤ 1− y, then bid 12 .
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• In the continuation game [K,NK], if vs > 1− y, then bid according to the C-S
equilibrium strategy for the 1
2
-double auction when the valuations of the buyer
and seller are distributed uniformly and independently on [y, 1] and [1 − y, 1]
respectively.
• In the continuation game [NK,K], if y ≤ 1 − y, then bid according to the C-S
equilibrium strategy for the 1
2
-double auction when the valuations of the buyer
and seller are distributed uniformly and independently on [0, y] and [0, 1 − y]
respectively.
Since  < 8(1−y)
17−8y , using Lemma 3.3(a), we get that the strategic-type players’ strategies are
sequentially rational in the continuation game [K,K]. Lemma 2 shows that the strategic-
type players’ strategies are sequentially rational in the continuation games [K,NK] and
[NK,K].
To prove that these strategies form an equilibrium, we show that there does not exist a
profitable deviation in the cheap-talk stage. Define,
D(vb) =((1− )(1− y) + )Ub(vb, [K,K]) + (1− )yUb(vb, [K,NK]) (5)
− (1− )(1− y)Ub(vb, [NK,K])
to be the gain that the strategic-type buyer with valuation vb receives from saying “Keen”
instead of “Not Keen” in the first stage and then playing optimally in the bargaining stage
given the seller’s strategy. We prove that D(vb) ≤ 0 for vb ≤ y and D(vb) ≥ 0 for vb ≥ y,
which implies that there does not exist a profitable deviation for any valuation type of the
strategic-type buyer in the cheap-talk stage.
In the continuation game [K,K], no valuation type of the strategic-type buyer will bid
above 1
2
(see the proof of Part 3(a) of Lemma 3). Also, all valuation types of the strategic-
type buyer with valuations less than 1
4
do not trade in this continuation game since the
lowest bid by the seller in this continuation game is 1
4
. Moreover, if the strategic-type buyer
with valuation vb ≥ 14 bids below 12 , then she must bid equal to 23vb + 112 because she can
then trade only with the behavioral-type seller. The latter fact implies that only valuation
types of the strategic-type buyer with valuations below 5
8
could possibly bid below 1
2
.
First, we prove that in the [K,K] continuation game, there exists a valuation type of
the strategic-type buyer with valuation vˆb ∈ (12 , 58) who is indifferent between bidding 12 and
2
3
vˆb +
1
12
and all valuation types of the strategic-type buyer with valuations in the interval
[1
4
, vˆb) bid below
1
2
and all valuation types of the strategic-type buyer with valuations above vˆb
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bid 1
2
. If the strategic-type buyer bids 1
2
, then her expected payoff is (1−˜)(vb− 12)+˜38(vb− 716).
If the strategic-type buyer with vb ≥ 14 bids 23vb+ 112 , then her expected payoff is ˜12(vb− 14)2.
vˆb is defined by the vb that solves,
f(vb) ≡ (1− ˜)
(
vb − 1
2
)
+ ˜
(
3
8
(
vb − 7
16
)
− 1
2
(
vb − 1
4
)2)
= 0.
The result follows from the facts that f(1
2
) < 0, f(5
8
) > 0 and f ′ > 0 if vb < 58 . Note that,
vˆb =
5
8
+ (1−)(1−y)

−
√
(1−)(1−y)(+4(1−)(1−y))
2
.
Second, we prove that D(vb) ≤ 0 if vb ≤ vˆb. Since vb ≤ vˆb < 58 , Ub(vb, [K,NK]) = 0
because the lowest bid in the [K,NK] continuation game is 5y
12
+ 1
3
which is greater than 5
8
as y > 0.7. Also,
Ub(vb, [K,K]) =

0 if vb ≤ 14
˜1
2
(vb − 14)2 if 14 < vb ≤ vˆb
(1− ˜)(vb − 12) + ˜38(vb − 716) if vb > vˆb
Finally,
Ub(vb, [NK,K]) =

0 if vb ≤ y4
1
2
(vb− y4 )2
1−y if
y
4
< vb ≤ 1− 3y4
vb − (1− 3y4 ) + 12(1− y) if vb > 1− 3y4
So ∀ vb ≤ y4 , all terms on the right-hand side of (5) are 0 and hence D(vb) = 0.
For vb ∈ (y4 , 14 ], D(vb) = −(1− )12(vb − y4 )2 < 0. For vb ∈ (14 , 1− 3y4 ],
D(vb) =
1
2
(

(
vb − 1
4
)2
− (1− )
(
vb − y
4
)2)
<
1
2
(
vb − y
4
)2
(− (1− )) < 0
because  < 1
2
.
Next, we show that D′(vb) < 0,∀ vb ∈ (1− 3y4 , vˆb).15 For vb ∈ (1− 3y4 , vˆb),
D(vb) =
1
2

(
vb − 1
4
)2
− (1− )(1− y)
(
vb −
(
1− 3y
4
)
+
1
2
(1− y)
)
.
15Note that 1− 3y4 < 12 < vˆb because y > 23 .
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Therefore,
D′(vb) = 
(
vb − 1
4
)
− (1− )(1− y)
< 
(
5
8
− 1
4
)
− (1− )(1− y) = 3
8
− (1− )(1− y).
The last term is negative whenever  < 8(1−y)
11−8y . The result follows from the fact that  <
8(1−y)
17−8y <
8(1−y)
11−8y . Since D(vb) ≤ 0 ∀vb ∈ [0, 1 −
3y
4
], D′(vb) < 0 ∀vb ∈ (1 − 3y4 , vˆb) and D(vb)
is a continuous on [0, vˆb], we get the result that D(vb) ≤ 0 ∀vb ≤ vˆb.
Lastly, we prove that D′(vb) > 0 ∀vb > vˆb. The derivative of the first term is equal to
(1− )(1− y)+ 38. The derivative of the second term is non-negative since, by the envelope
theorem, it is equals (1 − )y(Probability of trading). Finally, the derivative of the last
term is −(1− )(1− y). Hence for vb > vˆb,
D′(vb) =
3
8
+ (1− )y(Probability of trading) > 0.
From the above two results, that is, D(vb) ≤ 0 if vb ≤ vˆb and D′(vb) > 0 ∀vb > vˆb, and the
facts that D(y) = 0 and y > vˆb we get the result that D(vb) ≤ 0 for vb ≤ y and D(vb) ≥ 0
for vb ≥ y. 
Proof of Proposition 6: From Lemma 4, we know that if  < 1, then there does not exist
a Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium with 0 < y ≤ 1
4
.
Also, for  ∈ [244−36
√
5
829
, 1) there cannot exist a Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium
with y ≥ 3
4
. Pick an  ∈ [244−36
√
5
829
, 1). Suppose there exists a Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗
equilibrium with y ≥ 3
4
. In addition, suppose that  < 8(1−y)
17−8y . But this cannot happen
because 8(1−y)
17−8y =
244−36√5
829
when y = 5+
√
5
10
< 3
4
and 8(1−y)
17−8y is a decreasing function between
[0, 1]. So instead, suppose that 8(1−y)
17−8y ≤  ≤ 8(1−y)16y−7 . Then the pair (y, ) must satisfy the
necessary condition (3). But again, it can be shown that there does not exist a y ≥ 3
4
and
 ∈ [244−36
√
5
829
, 1) that satisfies the necessary condition. Finally, suppose that  > 8(1−y)
16y−7 .
In this case, the necessary condition for the pair (y, ) to be a Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗
equilibrium is (4). However, no such pair (y, ) with y ≥ 3
4
and  ∈ [244−36
√
5
829
, 1) exists.
To complete the proof, note that for any Monotonic-Symmetric-R∗ equilibrium, the ex-
ante probability of trade in the event that both players are strategic type is greater than
the ex-ante probability of trade in the C-S* equilibrium if y ∈ (1
4
, 3
4
). Suppose 1
4
< y ≤ 4
7
,
then the ex-ante probability of trade in the event that both players are strategic type is
9
32
+ 1
4
(1− y)(7
4
y− 1
4
), which is greater than 9
32
for all such y. If 4
7
< y < 5
8
, then the ex-ante
30
probability of trade among the strategic types is 1
2
(1− y
4
)2 − 1
2
(7
4
y− 1)2 − 1
2
(5
4
− 2y)2, which
is greater than 9
32
for this range of y. Finally, if 5
8
≤ y < 3
4
, then the ex-ante probability of
trade in the event that both players are strategic type is given by 3
2
y(1 − y), which is also
greater than 9
32
. 
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